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                    Executive Summary                                                       
II 
 
 
As part of our degree course we are required to undertake a final year thesis project. Audun 
Borg and Ronny Jakobsen were selected from  /Stord University – College (HSH) along with 
Richard McKeown, Benoit Guyonneau and Thomas Marshall from Edinburgh University to 
carry out a thesis project on Fire Safety Engineering: Case Study on Building Design 
Specifications. The objective of our case study was to carry out a performance-based fire 
safety analysis and design for a transportation centre. The results of our project are to be 
presented at The Fifth International Conference on Performance-Based Codes and Fire Safety 
Design Methods in Luxemburg, October 2004. 
 
We were provided with basic architectural plans showing the layout of the building and a 
short list of criteria which the building should adhere to. Any information that was required 
but not given, we could use our engineering judgement and make assumptions with regards to 
the specifications. 
 
This report considers nearly every aspect of the fire safety at the transporting centre like: 
alarm organisation, detectors, smoke control etc.  
 
Our strategy to tackling was to carryout a performance-based fire safety analysis. To 
undertake the performance-based analysis we chose to use three computational programs to 
model the building and carryout our analysis. It was used Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS) to 
model the design fires, Simulex to model the evacuation of the building and ABAQUS to 
model the structural integrity of the building.  
Calculations have been carryout to verify these simulations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The substance of this report is part of a final report that will be reproduced as a 
publication and later presented at the 5th International Conference on Performance 
Based Codes and Fire Safety Design Methods. This has been organised by the Society 
of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) and will be held in Luxemburg on October 6-8, 
2004.  
 
The final report has been made in cooperation with three students from civil and 
environmental engineering master degree course at the University of Edinburgh.  
 
This report considers nearly every aspect of the fire safety at the transporting centre 
like: alarm organisation, detectors, smoke control etc.  
The simulations made in developing the fire safety of the building is not considered in 
detail, but the results of the simulation have been used in this report. 
The simulations that have been carried out are:  
 
• ABAQUS, for the construction. 
• Simulex, for the evacuation. 
• FDS, for the fires.    
 
Chapter 8 gives a summary of al three simulations. 
 
1.2 Background Information 
Major fires within buildings are a rare event, however when they do occur they have 
the potential to destroy life and property on a large scale 
Over the years the protection process has been based around rules and regulations, 
such as those set out in the Norwegian and British Standards, which have been 
established and developed through past experiences, experimental practices and 
scientific theories. Generally these rules are centred on providing adequate passive 
measures, such as fire resistant doors, walls and compartments, and means of escape. 
The current rules could be improved substantially by enforcing the instalment of fire 
protection measures, such as sprinklers and other fire suppression measures, however 
this has the potential to become too expensive meaning buildings would be considered 
‘over-designed’.  
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1.3 The Protecting Process 
The protection process against fires can be split up into three sections;  
 
• Before the fire  
• During the fire  
• After the fire  
   
As it is almost impossible to eliminate fire, is it of vitally importance to reduce the 
possible consequences long before they occur. Therefore it is crucial to identifying 
potential ignition sources within a building and any objects or materials that may 
generate high levels of smoke and toxic fumes or contribute to rapid fire spread.  
 
By knowing these factors fire safety engineers can have a good understanding of the 
likelihood and intensity of potential fires and so generate models of how the building 
and its occupants will behave under these conditions. If the conditions are seen as too 
dangerous it is then a simple matter of readdressing the situation of ignition sources 
and combustible materials.  
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2. THE BUILDING  
2.1 Description of Building 
The following drawings show a sketch of the entire transportation centre and an 
architectural site plan and section drawing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 : Building sketch 
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Figure 8: Site plan and section drawing 
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2.2 Design Criteria 
2.2.1 General 
The building should meet a wide range of requirements which can be divided into 
three major fields: the wishes of the future owner, the sustainability requirements in 
normal conditions of use, and finally the requirements in the event of fire. 
 
2.2.2 Requirements of the client 
The building should obviously respect the wishes of the future owner: the city where 
the transportation centre will be built. 
Some basic plans of the building have been provided. See appendix1. 
The transportation centre shall be built according to these plans. Particularly, the 
positions of the columns and facades can not be changed or moved. The use of the 
different parts of the building has been indicated by the client.  
Here are the other requirements as specified in the subject of the thesis:  
 
“The city has requested that the following be provided within the transportation 
centre:  
 
• The dining terrace (+5m level) and the balcony where the shops are located on 
the 0m level shall be open to the waiting room below.  
 
• With the exception of the shops, no visual obstructions shall be provided 
between the waiting room and the rail platform (i.e. no doors or walls shall be 
installed between the waiting room and the rail platform).  
 
• The interior of the train terminal must convey a feeling of openness and be 
covered with long span construction with a maximum of glass to allow 
maximum natural lighting.  
 
• The bus terminal shall provide for ease of access to buses and include both 
bus storage and repair facilities. Fuelling of buses shall take place outside of 
the facility.  
 
• Other types of rooms as identified on the plans.”  
 
An other constraint induce by the use of the building is that the transportation centre 
will be located on the border of a country, so it shall welcome travellers who are 
coming from or going to other countries. That’s why it includes passport control and 
customs inspection stations. A secure area shall be provided for passengers who have 
cleared passport control to await their train. And even more important a secure are for 
evacuation of arriving passages who have not cleared customs and passport control.     
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All these requirements are giving a general line to follow, but a wide part of the 
design remains free such as the locations and the width of the stairs, the choice of all 
the materials constituting the structure of the building and the uses of some parts of 
the transportation centre not is specified. 
 
2.3 Design Assumptions 
• Trains will remain outside the transportation centre (i.e. not come under the 
bus loading area). We will therefore only have to design for fire loading on the 
external east face, due to possible burning train.  
• Only the trains shall be used for international travel and thus require passport 
control. 
 
• Bus information obtained from St. Andrews Square Bus Station, Edinburgh. 
12.2m long, 2.6m wide, 2.7m high, 14000Kg weight (un-laden, but including 
full fuel tank), Laden = 50 persons with average weight of 80Kg, each 
carrying 25Kg of luggage. 
 
• Street has been assumed to be pedestrianised. 
 
• It is assumed that there are appropriate foundations in place. 
 
• The Bus Loading Area and Bus Service / Repair Areas have been structurally 
designed to accommodate as many buses as possible. This is for an extreme 
situation (i.e. a bus drivers strike, or large demand / delay of buses). The 
Service / Repair area has been designed for 10 busses. The Bus Loading area 
has been designed for 15 fully loaded buses. 
 
• The assumed location of the transportation centre is in the London area and in 
an open space away from other buildings etc.  This assumption will be used as 
the basis for wind and snow loading. 
 
• It is assumed that it is not necessary to design for any notice boards / 
information signs etc that may normally be attached to walls or be suspended 
from the roof or roof trusses. 
 
• The design of the structure is in steel. 
 
• The building is designed to remain standing for the maximum size of design 
fire possible. 
 
• The areas on the top floor, that is not labelled, will be treated as storage rooms. 
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3. FIRE SAFETY STRATEGY 
3.1 General 
The main aims of the safety design are as follows:  
 
• Safeguard occupants from injury resulting from a fire  
• Safeguard fire fighters while they attack fires and evacuate the building  
• Avoid collapse of the structure due to fire  
• In the event of a fire, minimize the interruption to businesses  
 
The main fire safety strategy is to design the building so that it can remain standing 
and all it occupants can be evacuated safely, while ensuring that the building cost are 
kept at a minimum.  
The key aspects of the fire safety strategy which this report considers are as follows: 
 
• Evacuation 
• Compartmentation 
• Smoke control  
• Detection and alarm 
• Fire suppression 
• Access for fire appliances and fire fighters 
• Emergency lightning  
• Emergency power 
• Fire safety management   
 
3.2 Fire Suppression  
This requires the fire protection to be applied to the building only where it is 
absolutely necessary. Fire suppression is only provided in an area whit high fire load, 
the bus repair area.     
Otherwise are the only active fire safety measures, mechanical smoke extraction and 
self closing doors.     
 
3.3 Structural Protection  
The transportation centre has been design such that no structural protection is required 
on any of the structural elements. Detailed modelling of the building has been carried 
out using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) and a Finite Element Analysis 
computational program called ABAQUS. Results from the simulations with the 
corresponding fire loads will determent the dimensions of the buildings steel 
structure.   
For details about the simulations look in section 8. 
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4. FIRE SCENARIOS 
4.1 General  
The requirements to the building in the event of fire are as specified in the fire safety 
strategy.    
The purpose of the fire scenarios is to test if the building can stand a fire as it is 
suppose to. The choices of these scenarios are given by a search after worst case fire 
in each part of the building.  
Each of these seven scenarios is corresponding to a location of a fire in the building. 
 
• A bus burning in the bus loading area.  
• A bus burning in the bus repair area 
• A train carriage burning at the train platform.  
• A fire in one of the shops.  
• A baggage fire in the waiting areas.  
• A fire in the restaurant. 
• A fire in the kitchen.  
4.2 Design Fires 
 
 Location Fire Load 
(kW) 
Area of Fire 
(m2) 
Area of 
Ventilation 
 
Train 
 
Central 
 
16000 
 
33,6 
 
Natural 
ventilation 
Bus repair and 
loading area 
 
Central 
 
20000 
 
28,8 
Natural 
ventilation 
32 m2 
 
Restaurant 
 
Central 
 
3000 
 
3 m in  
diameter 
 
Tree vents 
5 m3/s pr vent 
 
Shop 
 
Central 
 
3750 
 
3,5 m in  
diameter 
 
Two vents 
7 m3/s pr vents 
Baggage fire in 
main waiting 
area  
 
Central 
 
1000 
 
1,6 m in 
diameter 
Natural 
ventilation 
44 m2 
Baggage fire in 
bus waiting 
area 
 
Central 
 
1000 
 
1,6 m in 
diameter 
Natural 
ventilation 
8 m2 
 
Kitchen*  
 
Against wall 
 
Curve 0-400 
 
0,4 
 
Two vents 
1,72 m3/s pr vent 
Table  1: Design Fire Summary  * This one is not calculated, but 
simulated in FDS 
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. 
4.2.1 The Train Fire 
The worst fire in a train carriage was found in a report from the company ARUP for 
the fire analysis of the St Pancras station: “St Pancras station – Fire Precautions and 
Evacuation” (100-RUP-RLEEA-00006-AF). They used “a conservative worst case 
16MW train fire, which represents the peak heat output of a single carriage of an old 
type class 415 carriage at 4 minutes after flashover.” 
As they are indicating in the ARUP report, a fire in a modern train as Eurostar train 
should have a lower heat output. Indeed materials are chosen to limit the propagation 
of the fire. 
 
4.2.2 The Bus Fire 
From: ‘Fire in Tunnels Proceedings’, Swedish National Testing and Research 
Institute, 1994. Was the average peak of heat release rate about 29MW. A steady state 
fire for a bus is desired, and with conditions that gives a lower heat release than for a 
tunnel fire a 20MW fire was chosen.   
 
4.2.3 Kitchen and Restaurant Fire 
In a professional kitchen the materials used for the cabinets and shelves are chosen to 
avoid fire spread. Thus this is limiting the probable size of the fire to the burning of a 
single item on the stove. 
A choice between two main types of fires has to be considered: 
 
• A fire produced by some oil forgotten on a burner igniting spontaneously 
• A fire produced by a plastic item forgotten on a burner. 
 
These two fires are not indeed providing high heat release rates. The fire produced by 
a plastic item forgotten on a burner has been finally chosen because the heat release 
rate found was slightly higher, but the first fire is a realistic fire scenario as well. 
The fire chosen had to be as realistic as possible, so the kitchen fire taken to recreate a 
real kitchen fire by the NIST in 2002 was finally preferred.  
 
For the second part of this scenario: fire in the restaurants eating area. Has there been 
chosen a 3 MW steady state heat release fire. It has been chosen a large fire load for 
this area because it is desirable to have good flexibility in the restaurant when it 
comes to choosing furniture, decorations etc.    
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4.2.4 The Shop Fire. 
The worst fire found for a shop fire was the one used by the company ARUP for the 
fire analysis of the St Pancras station – Fire Precautions and Evacuation” (100-RUP-
RLEEA-00006-AF) a 3750kW steady state fire. 
 
4.2.5 The baggage Fire 
For a baggage fire a 1000 kW steady state fire was chosen for the waiting areas, it is 
the same as ARUP used for the fire analysis of the St Pancras station –” Fire 
Precautions and Evacuation” (100-RUP-RLEEA-00006-AF). 
                                                                                             
                                                                                                         
   
11/45 
 
 
5. FIRE PROTECTING SYSTEMS 
5.1 Structural Protection 
The structural elements have been designed to stand and maintain bearing throughout 
the life of potential fires without use of any structural protection.  
 
5.2 Compartmentation 
Due to the function requirements and the nature of the geometry, has the building 
been divided into zones. The measure proposed to prevent fire spread between zones 
is a combination of sub-compartmentation within zones, active suppressions and 
smoke control.  
    
The zones:  
Zone 1A: Restaurant area with lobby. 
Zone 1B: Kitchen. 
Zone 2:    Main entrance and lobby on street level, lower level and half of the waiting       
area. 
Zone 3:    Shops, storage rooms on top of shops and half of the waiting area. 
Zone 4A: Bus terminal, waiting area. 
Zone 4B: Bus terminal, loading area. 
Zone 5:    Bus repair and storage room. 
Zone 6A: Train waiting area. 
Zone 6B: Departure waiting area, after passport control. 
Zone 6C: Arrival area, before custom control. 
Zone 6D: Customs control room. 
Zone 6E: Train platform. 
 
Compartmentation to prevent fire spread between different zones of the building and 
within zones has been provided in accordance with Approved Document B.  
It is several fire cells within some of the zones, the offices and shops in zone 2 and 3 
are for example designed as fire cells.   
Every wall in the building will be with fire resistance according to BS 5588-11/1997.  
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Figure 9: Plan & Section Drawings Showing Zoning Areas of Building 
 
Figure 10: 3D Drawing Showing Zoning Areas of Building 
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5.2.1 Fire spread from floor to floor 
Every floor in this building is made of 20 cm concrete, and designed to withstand a 
fire without spreading the fire to other floors.   
 
5.2.2 Zone 1A - Restaurant area with lobby 
This zone will be equipped with mechanical smoke control systems. The calculations 
show that it is necessary with only one extraction point in this area. But because of the 
shape will there be provided three. One extraction point in the lobby and two in the 
restaurant area. Every wall in this area will be with one hour fire resistance.  
If a fire starts in this zone all the doors in this area will automatically self close. 
Doors that self close will people be able to open, but when they are gone through the 
door will close again. 
 
5.2.3 Zone 1B – Kitchen 
It has a mechanical smoke ventilation system for transportation of smoke made from 
cooking and one for the event of fire. This system will be automatically put on in the 
event of an alarm goes of in this zone. The system can be controlled from the fire 
alarm panels. The walls shall have one hour fire resistance. The cooking station will 
be installed with a wet chemical system.  
 
If a fire starts in this zone all the doors in this area and in the restaurant will 
automatically self close. 
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Figure 11: Wet Chemical system (KIDDE system) 
  
 
 
 
How it works: 
 
1: The fire is detected by heat detectors that activates the control box (or the 
manual station is activated) and the container valve is opened. 
 
2: Wet chemical is stored under pressure in the container and is led through the 
piping and out through the nozzles. All electrical installations is turned 
automatically of. 
 
3: The wet chemical strangulates the fire fast and forms a protection layer that    
extinguishes the fire and disables the fire to flare up again.  
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5.2.4 Zone 2 - Main entrance and lobby on street level, lower level and half 
of the waiting area. 
This zone has a lot of different units, such as shops, offices, storage and a control 
room. A fire in this area will be contained, until the Fire Brigade arrives, with walls 
that have a fire resistance of one hour. The shops in this area will have a mechanical 
smoke ventilation system. 
 
In the waiting area a smoke curtain will drop down from the ceiling when the alarm 
goes to stage “Big alarm”. If a fire starts in this zone all the doors in this area and in 
zone 1A and 3 will automatically self close, except from the main entrance and the 
exits in the west that supports air in.  
 
5.2.5 Zone 3 - Shops, storage rooms (+5m) and half of the waiting area. 
The shops and the storage rooms will have walls with fire resistance of one hour.  
A mechanical smoke ventilation system is placed in the shops.  
If a fire starts in this zone all the doors in this area and in zone 1A and 2 will 
automatically self close, except from the main entrance and the exits in the west that 
supports air in.  
 
5.2.6 Zone 4A – Bus Terminal, waiting area 
This area will have natural smoke ventilation and the fire resistance on the walls shall 
be at least one hour. The wall that separates the bus terminal area with the bus repair 
and storage room shall be made of 20 cm concrete. 
If a fire starts in this zone all the doors in this area will automatically self close, 
except from the main entrance and the exits in the west corner that supports air in.  
 
5.2.7 Zone 4B – Bus loading area 
Natural smoke ventilation is located in this area. As seen in section 5.2.6 the wall 
against the repair area shall be of 20 cm concrete. 
 
5.2.8 Zone 5 - Bus repair and storage room 
Natural smoke ventilation and a system with water screens (see 6.3.1) between the 
buses are located in this area. As seen in section 5.2.6 the wall against the bus waiting 
area shall be of 20 cm concrete, the west wall shall also be of 20 cm concrete.  
 
5.2.9 Zone 6 A, B and C – Train waiting area. 
A mechanical smoke ventilation system is located at this area, and the walls shall 
have a fire resistance of one hour. 
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5.3 Smoke Control 
The smoke control strategy for the building will be a combination of natural 
ventilation and automatic mechanical extraction.  
The principle adopted is that smoke will be prevented from compromising escape and 
make as little damage to the building that it will entail closing of the building. 
 
In the event of a fire in zone 2 and 3 will the smoke be let out into the waiting area 
and out of the hatches in the ceiling. All areas with air-conditioned or where a smoke 
control system is provided, can be used by the Fire Brigade to assist their operations. 
Hatches used for natural ventilation, can also be used as part of the ventilation of the 
building in normal use.  
 
5.3.1 Zones 1a and 1b - Restaurant and Kitchen 
Mechanical smoke extraction will be provided. The fan in the restaurant must extract 
totally 15 ms/s, and it shall be located on the roof. The restaurant will be provided 
with two extraction points and one in the restaurants lobby (i.e. 5m3/s).  
There will bee provided two extraction points in the kitchen, the fan needs to extract 
minimum 1, 73 m3/s from each extraction point. 
 
5.3.2 Zone 2 – Main entrance and lobby on street level, floor below lobby 
and half of the waiting area. 
If a fire starts in one of this areas the smoke will be let out throw the hatches in the 
ceiling in the waiting area.  
A smoke curtain will drop down in centre of the waiting area to prevent the smoke 
from flowing to the other zones.  
This curtain will drop down 9m; this will be 13m above the floor. This is to prevent 
the smoke from spreading to the hole waiting area. It will be placed in centre of the 
room.  
 
The natural ventilation will provide a clear layer at 14m above the floor in the waiting 
area. It has been calculated how much smoke a baggage fire will make, and then how 
much ventilation is needed in the ceiling.  
The total ventilation area on one side of the curtain must be: 44m2. The hatch will be 
operated with hydraulics that is connected to the alarm system.  
 
The shops in this area will be supported with a mechanical ventilation system that will 
extract 14 m3/s smoke per shop. There will be two extraction points placed in each 
shop point will extract 7 m3/s.  
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5.3.3 Zone 3 - Shops, storage rooms on top of shops and half of the waiting 
area.  
It is the same for this zone as for the zone above. The smoke will be let out of the 
hatches in the ceiling in the waiting area and through fans with the same size as above 
for the shops. It will also be 44 m2  with hatches for ventilation on this side of the 
curtain. 
 
5.3.4 Zone 4 A and B – Bus Terminal 
Natural ventilation through smoke hatches, that is distributed all over the ceiling.  
It shall be put in hatches that have an area of 8 m2 at the bus waiting area and 32 m2 at 
the loading area. 
Every hatch will be operated with hydraulics that is connected to the alarm system.  
 
5.3.5 Zone 5 – Bus repair and storage area 
Natural ventilation through smoke hatches in the ceiling.  
It shall be put in hatches that have an area of 32 m2.  
Every hatch will be operated with hydraulics that is connected to the alarm system. 
 
5.3.6 Zone 6 A, B and C – Passport control, and waiting area to the trains. 
Mechanical smoke extraction will be provided in this area. There will be provided two 
extraction points in each area in this zones (zone 6: A, B and C), except from zone 6D 
where it is only necessarily with one extraction point. The fan needs a minimum 
extraction capacity of 22 m3/s smoke, and located on the best suitable place. 
 
The walls in this area are made of glass, but do not go all the way up to the ceiling. 
 
5.4 Surface Spread of Flames 
All internal surfaces will be Class 0 (Approved Document B): material non-
combustible or presenting a limited combustibility. 
  
It is not possible to control furniture and fittings through Building Regulations.  
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5.5 Detection and Alarm 
This transportation centre will be provided with an analogue addressable fire 
detection system in accordance with BS5839 Part 1/2002. 
Type L1X, linked to a voice and visual alarm system which will be used to raise and 
control a phased evacuation.  
The recommendations of BS5839 Part 1 on the general design, control, equipment and 
zoning of multiple occupancy should be followed. 
 
5.5.1 Detection 
The fire detection system will be used to initiate fire investigation procedures and 
automatic operation of plant associated with smoke control, public evacuation and 
other life and property systems.  
 
Depending on the method of detecting will the station be provided with: smoke, heat, 
flame and aspirating detectors. 
 
Because of high level of staffing and management procedures associated with the 
platforms and size of the space and the nature of potential fire sources will there not 
be automatic detectors on the train’s platform. 
  
Smoke detectors will be provided throughout the centre, with the exception of the 
platforms and some places with heat detectors. 
 
Heat detections will be provided where the ambient air quality or steam would render 
a smoke detector unsuitable such as the kitchen and vehicle loading areas. 
 
A combination of heat and flame detectors will be provided in areas that are likely to 
contain material that will contribute to a rapid fire spread, such as the loading bay and 
storage rooms. 
An aspirating system is installed in the control room to make sure an early detection 
of smoke before outbreak of flaming combustion.  
 
Manuel help points, break glass units and CCTV surveillance system will be provided 
throughout the transportation centre giving additional fire safety.       
 
Automatic fire detection is necessary to satisfy legislation under this circumstance: 
Where fire protection systems, such as door closing facilities or smoke control 
systems, are to be operated. 
 
The whole Transporting Centre will be provided with a category L1 and P system. 
 
Category L systems are automatic fire detection systems intended for the protection of 
life. 
Category L1 is a system installed throughout all areas of the building. 
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The objective of the system is to offer the earliest possible warning of fire, so as to 
achieve the longest available time for escape. 
Even in buildings with comprehensive fire detection, the provision of manual call 
points will still normally be of great value; people in the vicinity of a fire will 
normally be aware of the fire, and able to raise the alarm by use of a manual call 
point, before it is detected automatically. 
Therefore it will be put out some manual call points inside the building.  
 
Category P systems are automatic fire detection systems intended for the protection of 
property.  
Category P1 is a system installed throughout all areas of the building. 
The objective of the system is to offer the earliest possible warning of fire so as to 
minimize the time between ignition and the arrival of fire-fighters. 
 
5.5.2 Manual Break Glass Units 
In each areas there will be placed out manual break glass units, so people can give an 
manual alarm if they discoverer a fire before the fire alarm has been activated.   
These units will be linked to and compatible with the central fire control panel.  
 
5.5.3 Alarms 
Alarms will be given by means of a voice and visual alarm system to public areas. 
Every monitor in the public areas shall give a visual alarm for the people with 
impaired hearing. This message will be pre-recorded and start automatically if the fire 
alarm system goes in alarm. The different alarms will give different messages. 
 
There have been some good results from tests with directive public address 
announcement; this has shown that the result is much shorter pre-movement and 
evacuation times. The messages will be pre-recorded and automatic with manual 
override facilities. Links with the voice alarm system will be provided at the 
emergency services rendezvous points using a fireman’s microphone and the 
management suite for other conditions when coded staff alarms are made. The voice 
alarm system will also be used for multilingual public announcements. 
 
Fire sounders will be provided in staff areas where they are familiarity with the 
premises. 
 
The alarm system will use a delayed evacuation initiated, based upon a “double 
knock” system. Upon receipt of an alarm from a single smoke detector or an alarm 
from a single manual call point, an alarm will be given to allow staff a pre-determined 
time to investigate the incident prior to the automatic evacuation process being 
initiated. 
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The second stage of the alarm will be initiated by either the allowed time elapsing 
without action, another smoke detector goes of, manual call point being received or a 
manual break glass unit is triggered.  
At this stage the evacuation procedure will be activated and the fire brigade will be 
called to attend the transportation centre. 
 
The platform that has no smoke detectors, the second stage alarm will be initiated 
either by the allowed time elapsing without action, manual call point being received, a 
manual break glass unit is triggered or by the guards. 
         
The fire alarm panel will be located in the control room and one fireman’s panel at 
every entrance. 
 
  
Type of alarm Signal Activating  Action 
Pre caution  (not alarm 
level) 
Light up and buzzes in 
fire alarm central  
 
 
Some dust or similar in 
detectors. 
Fix it and reset 
The alarm goes not 
to the next stage. 
Quiet alarm (1. stage) 
 
Time delay  for next 
stage: 2 min 
 
Light up and buzzes in 
fire alarm central. Call 
guards via phone/pager. 
Detection of smoke or 
similar in a detector. 
Check cause, reset 
or activate big 
alarm.   
 
Big alarm (2. stage) 
 
Evacuation  
 
No time delay 
Triggers all alarm 
organs in the building 
(bells, voice and visual 
systems) 
Signal goes to Fire 
Brigade and all guards 
in the building. 
 Two or more smoke 
detectors go in alarm. 
Manual break glass unit 
trigged.  
Not reset quiet alarm 
 
 Start evacuation 
and putting out the 
fire if it’s possible. 
Table 2: Type of alarm 
 
5.5.4 Vertical Transportation  
The elevator will return to street level and bee locked with the door inn open position. 
The escalators will be turned of when the alarm goes in the different zones. It is 
important that they do not stop right away but stops slowly so no one falls and get 
injured.  
They can bee started again by employers to make the evacuation from the train 
waiting area more efficient.       
 
5.5.5 Cabling 
Every cable connected to the alarm system, voice and visual alarm system will be 
wired using cabals complying with BS 6387 that has been categorised as CWZ. 
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5.6 Fire Suppression  
Active fire suppression will be provided inn rooms and areas in the building where it 
is necessary for the safety for occupants, and in areas whit great economical value. 
 
The bus storage and repair area, zone 5, and the control room are specially considered 
in chapter 6. For details and illustrations look in appendix 1. 
 
5.7 Access for fire appliance  
Fire brigade can enter the building at all the marked entrances in the figure under, the 
north and south entrance on the rail terminal is for fire brigade entrance only. At these 
locations large doors are to be provided and kept clear for fire fighters.   
There shall also be a building plan and fire zone diagrams clearly provided. 
The main entrance for the fire brigade should be through the main entrance because of 
the control room, look in chapter 5.8 Fire safety management.    
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Symbols according to: NS-ISO 6790, 1. 1993 
 
 
         Building control room  
  24 hour guards.      with fire panels. 
 
  Attack way for     Restricted evacuation area  
  Fire brigade.       International passengers. 
   
   
  Access to building    Evacuation area for all  
        other occupants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
Guards 
N 
Guards 
C - Room
C - Room 
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5.8 Fire Safety Management  
Fire safety is to be managed from the control room and is to be manned 24 hours a 
day. This room will work as a Crisis Management Room in an event of a fire or other 
crisis. The control room is to be located in the room marked as ‘Office’ next to the 
main entrance to the building on the street level ±0 m. This room will contain the 
CCTV surveillance screens of the entire building, fire panels, ventilation control and a 
central alarm system. 
Should an incident occur to the control room that disabled the fire panels, a visual 
display of the state of the fire system is available on the fire mans panels. These 
panels are located at every entrance, also in the fireman’s entrances on the sides of the 
terminal building. 
Control of the fire safety systems is possible by using a lap-top computer which can 
by plugged into the system either at the fireman’s panels.   
Other aspects of the fire safety management are not considered in this report. The 
fully development should be done in line with the operational requirements of the 
users. 
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6 Special Areas 
6.1 General  
The bus storage and repair area is considered to bee an area that will require special 
fire protecting systems because of the high fire load. 
One of the scenarios is bus fire in the repair area. There can be up to ten buses stored 
there plus various spare parts.  
It is therefore important not to allow a fire in one bus spread uncontrolled to other 
busses. 
 
To achieve that is it important to reduce the heat radiation from one bus to the next as 
much as possible. And ventilate the hot smoke to reduce the radiation back from the 
hot smoke layer. 
 
The other special area in the building is the control room located in street level near 
main entrance to the building on the street level ±0 m. 
It is of vitally importance for the transporting centre to keep the electrical equipment 
in this room operational.  
      
6.2 Heat radiation bus area   
In order to calculate the heat radiation, was it necessary to make some assumptions: 
 
• The window, on the side of the bus, goes all the way from the front to the rear. 
• The fire is located on the edge of the windows. 
• Heat radiation from the fire plum outside the windows is not considered. 
• The flame temperature is 1300 K (1027 °C) and the emissivity is sat to 1.0.  
 
Some of these assumptions are conservative, like the flame temperature at 1300K and 
that the side of the bus is one window. On the other hand is it not considered to 
assume that the fire plume is located on the edge of the windows. Some of the flames 
will come out of the windows and be even closer to the next bus, creating even more 
heat radiation. 
The sum of these assumptions makes a conservative estimate. 
    
The calculations (appendix 5) show that with a distance of 1 meter between the busses 
is the heat radiation over 70 kW/m2, from one bus to the next. But with a distance of 2 
meters is the radiation down to 40 kW/m2.   
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6.3 Fire Protection  
6.3.1 Bus area  
Because of the high heat radiation a burning bus provide, is there a risk that the next 
bus will self ignite. It is therefore necessary to install fire protection systems in this 
area to inhibit the fire to spread from one bus to the next. 
 
This area will therefore be provided with water screens and smoke control. Water 
screen creates a “wall” of water from the floor and approximately 6 meters up, and 
spreads total 24 metres. The water drops will reflect and absorb much of the heat 
radiation. Some of the drops will hit the busses or the fire plum and give a some 
cooling effect; this is not considered in the calculations.    
Water screens take away about 65 % of the heat radiation, and will be placed between 
every bus. It shall be installed and integrated down in the floor. 
Busses that are stored over night will be placed with 1, 2 meters distance between 
them on marked parking places. It is very important that the buses are placed on these 
marked places. Heat radiations between the busses when the water screen is 
operational are reduced to approximately 22 kW/m2. 
In an event of fire in this area will in worst case only one bus burn completely up. 
For water screen results, look in appendix 4. 
 
6.3.2 Control room  
There will not bee installed more fire suppression in the control room, but the room 
will bee provided with an aspiration smoke detector. This is a more sophisticated 
detector than the traditional smoke detectors; this provides a faster response to smoke 
in the room. The control room will be manned 24 hours a day, so they will be able to 
start fire extinguishing as early in the fire development as possible.    
The room will bee provided with a CO2 fire extinguisher.   
 
6.4 Smoke ventilation     
A fire in the bus storage and repair area will produce large volume of smoke. The 
smoke will be ventilated by natural ventilation through hatches on the roof. 
The smoke hatch area is set to be 32 m2, it is calculated to be 7 meters from floor to 
smoke layer, and the calculations are in appendix 3. 
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7 EVACUATION  
Shown in Appendix 1. 
 
The evacuation of the building is made so it may not always be necessarily to 
evacuate those parts of the transportation centre which remain unaffected by a fire in 
another area of the building. This is described further in the next sections. People shall 
be lead out to designated areas when their being evacuated.   
 
The philosophy of the alarm and detection system will be integrated into the zoning so 
that upon evacuation of a zone or group of zones, the other zones will be put on alert. 
 
Simulex program have been used to simulate evacuation times. 
 
All over the transportation centre the management will direct people out and to 
designated areas and making sure that people do not go to areas where the alarm has 
gone of. 
 
7.1 Platform Evacuation 
In the event of a train fire at platform level or a fire in zone 6, people in zone 1, 2 and 
3 will be put on alert but not necessarily evacuated. People in zone 4 and 5 will be 
evacuated. The voice and visual alarm system will be used to give message to 
evacuate this area and warn people in rest of the building not to go to this area.  
 
It is important that people that has not gone through customs is separated from other 
people. They will be directed to a restricted area so they can go through customs and 
passport control later. 
  
7.1.1 Zone 6A and 6B shown in drawing nr 4. 
People in this area will evacuate to the west and up the stairs to street level, or through 
zone 6B and out to the platforms and there by up to the street.   
 
7.1.2 Zone 6C and D shown in drawing nr 4. 
People in this zones shall evacuate out to the platform and there by to street level or 
up the stair on south wall in zone 6C and out to the street. They shall go to a restricted 
area.  
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7.1.3 Zone 6E, shown in drawing nr 4. 
For International platforms, escape is possible to both north and south. This stairs led 
to a restricted area outside of the building. 
 
For national platforms, escape will be up stairs to the north and south. These lead out 
to the street. 
 
7.2 Terminal Evacuation 
In the event of a fire in this zone, people in zone 1, 2 and 3 will be evacuated. People 
in zone 4, 5 and 6 will be put on alert but not necessarily evacuated. The voice and 
visual alarm system will be used to give message to evacuate this area and warn 
people at rest of the building not to go to this area.  
 
7.2.1 Zone 1A and 1B, shown in drawing nr 6. 
From the kitchen there are two doors that lead out to the restaurant. There it is 
possible to escape down two different stairs, one is located in the lobby in the north 
and one is located at the southeast corner of the restaurant. These lead to street level 
inside the transportation centre. From her people can go either to the main entrance in 
the west or through the waiting area and out the doors in the east. 
 
7.2.2 Zone 2, shown in drawing nr 2 and 3.  
People can both escape out the main entrance at the west or up the stairs at the shops 
and out through the doors in the east. 
 
7.2.3 Zone 3, shown in drawing nr 3. 
People can both escape out the main entrance at the west or up the stairs at the shops 
and out through the doors in the east. 
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7.3 Bus Station Evacuation 
In the event of a fire in this zone, people in this zone and in zone 5 and 6 will be 
evacuated. People in zone 1, 2 and 3 will be put on alert but not necessarily 
evacuated. The voice and visual alarm system will be used to give message to 
evacuate this area and warn people at rest of the station not to go to this area.  
 
7.3.1 Zone 4 – Bus Terminal, shown in drawing nr 5. 
Evacuation from this area can be done through doors in the east or west, both leads to 
out to the street. 
 
7.3.2 Zone 5 – Bus repair and storage area, shown in drawing nr 5.  
Escape can be done through the gates at the north. 
 
7.4 Disabled and Special Needs Evacuation  
Disabled people shall meat at marked areas at the station for evacuation. The 
management will then help them out. These areas are located at the escalators at zone 
2; at the stairs in the restaurant, nearby the stairs at the shops in zone 3 and at the 
escalators in the passport control room.  
 
7.5 Emergency Lightning and Signing  
An emergency lightning system will be installed throughout the station to cover both 
occupied and unoccupied areas (as shown in Appendix 1). The installation will be 
designed in accordance with BS5266 Part 1, and contain the following mode of 
operations: 
 
• All designated escape routes will be category M/2 (with 1 hour battery 
duration due to having dual supply). 
• The control room will be category NM/3. 
• Other areas and plant rooms will be category NM/1.  
 
Exit signs will be maintained on all times and have the same battery duration as the 
areas they serve. 
Retail areas will provide their own emergency lightning installations which comply 
with Retail Fit-Out Guide. 
 
All public and operationally critically areas shall have addition to emergency 
lightning, a percentage of normal lightning installation supplied from a standby source 
to allow operation of the station under a loss of main conditions.  
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Each emergency luminaire, which is also part general lightning installation, will be 
fitted wit a change over relay that will monitor loss of normal supply. All emergency 
fittings will be equipped with LED indication of battery backup.  
 
Emergency signage will be provided throughout the station as part of an integrated 
signage package and commonly accepted pictograms will be used wherever 
applicable, in locations to be agreed with HMRI and Fire Authorities. 
 
7.6 Emergency Power 
This station will be provided with a secure electrical network comprising dual 
independent incoming HV supplies.  
Fans used for mechanical smoke extract will be supplied via fire rated cables. 
Emergency generators will not be provided. 
 
Every smoke control fans will have duty/standby motor configurations fed from 
independent sources and be wired in CWZ grade cables. 
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8 SIMULATION PROGRAMS  
The simulation calculations in chapter 8 are a summary of the reports from the 
students at the University of Edinburgh. 8.1 Abaqus simulation is made by Thomas 
Marshall, 8.2 the FDS simulation is made by Benoit Guyonneau and 8.3 the Simulex 
simulation is made by Richard McKeown.  
 
8.1 ABACUS 
8.1.1 Background 
ABAQUS is a computational program, which models structures using finite element 
analysis to determine how they will perform under certain design conditions.  Finite 
element analysis is the breaking down of a rigid structure into finite elements, which 
are deformable. Rigid bodies, on the other hand, move through space without 
changing shape. ABAQUS uses the multiple rigid bodies within a finite element 
program to create a deformable structure that can be analysed. 
 
The ABAQUS program has been used to model and analyse, the behaviour of a 
structural elements in the transportation centre, using two-dimensional cross-sections 
through the building. It’s then possible examine how the structure will perform under 
both static and thermal loading conditions.  
 
It will be showed that the actual temperature conditions that will be created by the 
design fires that have been modelled in FDS are less severe than the standard fire 
temperature conditions that are specified in BS 8110. 
 
8.1.2 Results and Analysis 
The ABAQUS results show that the maximum displacements caused by applying the 
standard temperature time curve to the structural elements in the vicinity of the design 
fires are significant, but not sufficient to cause the building to collapse. 
 
The deflections experienced when running the ABAQUS models with the design fire 
temperature time curves are also significantly smaller than those experienced under 
the standard fire conditions.  Figures 6-9 below show the displacements caused to the 
sections by the temperature time curve produced by FDS.  All of the displacements 
are scaled up by a factor of 100. 
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Figure 12: Kitchen: FDS Fire 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Shop: FDS Fire 
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Figure 14: Train: FDS Fire 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Bus: FDS Fire 
        
 
 
 
 
 
8.1.3 Conclusion 
Consequently, the results show that if a performance-based analysis of a building is 
carried out then money can be saved on fire protection and the building will also be 
safer as all the possible hazards will have been identified and designed for.  
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8.2 Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) 
To forecast the fire behaviour a computer program dedicated to the transfers of heat 
and the production of gases involved in combustion reactions: Fire Dynamics 
Simulator (FDS), has been used. 
Fire Dynamics Simulator is a CFD model (Computational Fluid Dynamics). A CFD 
model requires that the compartment considered be divided into small three-
dimensional rectangular volumes or computational cells. 
FDS is used to model and analyse 3 dimensionally the consequences of a fire in terms 
of temperature distribution, heat transport and behaviour of the smoke released. The 
visualization of the results of an FDS calculation is done with the program 
Smokeview. The results can after be used as a base for other analysis to determinate 
for example the behaviour of the structure and also the time necessary for people to 
evacuate the building.  
Fire Dynamics Simulator has been developed by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST). FDS and Smokeview are freewares and can be downloaded 
on the website of NIST: http://www.bfrl.nist.gov/. This project is based upon FDS 3.1 
and Smokeview 4.0. 
 
8.2.1 Model Uncertainty 
FDS can provide valuable insight into how a fire may develop. However the model is 
only a simulation.  
But provided that there are a lot of uncertainties on the fire sizes, fire sites and on the 
possible other fuel loads, it can be assumed that conservative choices for these inputs 
will compensate these uncertainties. 
Nevertheless basic verifications will be conducted to check if the results seem correct. 
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8.2.2 Performance criteria 
The building must fulfil the requirements of fire and life safety. To know if this is the 
case, it’s necessarily to know if one of the two critical conditions was reached:  
 
• Structure gets too hot to sustain the loading 
• Too much heat or lethal products in the building or compartment to allow safe 
evacuation. 
 
The knowledge of these two conditions was also required: critical values of the 
temperature and of the heat or lethal products release in each scenario. 
If one of these two critical conditions is reached, an increase of the structural 
dimensions and perhaps the use of fire protections are required and other series of 
tests have to be conducted.  
Thus the performance criteria selected to assess the fire safety goals is in this project 
the assurance that the critical values of the temperature and of the heat or lethal 
products release in each scenario won’t be reached. 
 
8.2.4 Results 
To determine the conditions in the rooms, so it can be accessed whether or not people 
in the rooms will be able to evacuate safely, slices have been taken to measure the 
following: evolution of temperature, visibility, concentration of carbon monoxide and 
concentration of carbon dioxide.  
 
When considering the safety of the occupants the conditions below a level of 2.5m are 
most interesting. This is because the vast majority of people will be beneath this level.  
When examining the temperature conditions in the rooms, it is most concerned with 
the maximum temperature of air that can be breathed. “Occupants can not breathe 
‘wet’ air at more than 100°C and ‘dry’ air at more than 220°C”. When examining the 
visibility conditions in the rooms a value of about 2 metres should be sufficient to 
allow for occupants in an “involved tenant space” to find their way out of that space 
and in more vast areas a visibility of 10m people should be sufficient. 
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Table 3 shows how different concentrations of Carbon Monoxide physiologically 
affect humans and table 4 shows how different concentrations of Carbon Dioxide 
physiologically affect humans. 
 
  Parts of CP per million parts of air 
Threshold limit value 50 
Concentration which can be 
inhaled for 1 hour without 
appreciable effect 
400 to 500 
Concentration causing 
unpleasant symptoms after 1 
hour of exposure 
1000 to 2000 
Dangerous concentration for 
exposure of 1 hour 1500 to 2000 
Concentrations that are fatal in 
exposure of less than 1 hour 4000 and above 
Table 3: Physiological Response to Various Concentrations of CO 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Parts per 
million 
parts of 
air 
The threshold limit for CO2, that is the 
concentration that can be tolerated by workers 
day after day without adverse effect 
5,000 
Stimulation is pronounced, and 30-minute 
exposure produces signs of intoxication 50,000 
Unconsciousness results in a few minutes 70,000 
Loss of consciousness is predicted to occur 
within 2 minutes 100,000 
Table 4: Physiological Response to Various Concentrations of CO2 
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8.2.4 Conclusion 
The knowledge of the fire behaviour is the basic point of the project.  Understanding 
the possible fire scenarios gives all the data necessary to forecast the structural 
behaviour of the building, the concentrations of lethal products and the distribution of 
heat within the building, consequently giving us all the information necessary to 
undertake an evacuation analysis. 
 
The results of the FDS analysis show that for the design fire scenarios that it has been 
adopted temperatures and the concentrations of lethal products in the air are at levels 
that allow safe evacuation of the building. 
 
FDS can provide valuable insight into how a fire may develop.  However, the model 
is only a simulation and there a lot of uncertainties on the fire sizes, fire sites and on 
the possibility other fuel loads being present.  Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the 
conservative estimates that have been adopted for these inputs will compensate for 
these uncertainties.  Even so basic verifications will be conducted to check if the 
results seem correct. 
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8.3 Simulex 
During the early stages of the project, four main fire scenarios were identified as the 
most important to concentrate on for this study.  
It was also considered very important to test a scenario where the whole 
transportation centre had to be evacuated, for example in the situation of a bomb scare 
or something similar. 
 
As a result, five main evacuation scenarios were identified to be tested using the 
Simulex programme. 
 
8.3.1 Assumptions from simulex booklet 
• No people have started the simulation within the stairway  
• People are initially starting the simulation in a static position 
• There is no time delay for people to react to the alarms and decide to evacuate 
• The scenarios have been modelled for a ‘rush hour’ situation 
• Max populations considered 
 
8.3.2 Aims and Objectives 
The Simulex program is used to show that the building can be safely evacuated, for 
any of the alternative fire scenarios that have been mentioned earlier, before untenable 
conditions and reached within the building. 
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8.3.4 Background 
Simulex is a software package which models the evacuation of large populations from 
multi-storey buildings. The software accurately models the movement of each 
individual person in a total building simulation. 
Simulex allows the user to set up a populated building very quickly, by importing 
CAD drawings. The building space is analysed by the program, and accurate travel 
distances and exit routes are calculated throughout the entire building automatically, 
within a few minutes. 
The software is based on real-life data which enables it to model human movement, 
simulating behaviour which includes side-stepping and overtaking patterns, speed 
fluctuations and queuing behaviour. Each person’s position, orientation, walking 
speed and route-assessment is modelled every 0.1 seconds.  
The user can watch a simulated evacuation on-screen as it happens, and areas such as 
crowded stairways and congested doorways can be seen immediately through 
different animated ‘windows’. Each simulation can be recorded onto hard disk for 
repeat viewing and analysis. 
The Institute for Environment and Sustainability (IES) believes that the information 
provided by Simulex surpasses planning control in most countries. Modelling 
building evacuations with Simulex adheres to the modern concept of ‘performance-
related’ design, where simple engineering rules are replaced by the integration of 
advanced engineering solutions. 
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8.3.5 The Model 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Simulex program 
 
 
 
8.3.6 Results 
Figure 11 and Table 5 show the time taken for people to evacuate the building for the 
different fire scenarios.  Scenario 1 represents the situation where there has been a 
bomb scare and everyone has to evacuate the building immediately.  This is 
considered to be the worst case scenario as there is the maximum number of people to 
be evacuated.  As figure 15 shows, initially there are approximately 2750 people in 
the building and it takes them approximately 230 seconds to completely evacuate the 
building. 
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Figure 17: Graph showing Evacuation Times for the Different Scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fire Scenario 
Code Fire Origin 
1 No Fire- Bomb Scare Scenario 
2 Kitchen Area of Restaurant 
3a Any of the Shops on Street Level (0m) 
3b Southern Shop on -5m Level  
3c Central Shop on -5m Level 
3d Northern Shop on -5m Level 
4 Bus Situated in Bus Terminal 
5 
Train Carriage Situated to East of 
Building 
Table 5: Fire Scenario Code 
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Scenario Population to be Evacuated  Evacuation Time 
1 2736 
 3 minutes 
44.6seconds 
2 221 
 2 minutes 43.4 
seconds 
3a 186 
 2 minutes 31.6 
seconds 
3b 1204 
 2 minutes 45.7 
seconds  
3c 1204 
 2 minutes 55.1 
seconds  
3d 1204 
 2 minutes 55.1 
seconds 
4 1204  31.5 seconds  
5 1204 
 3 minutes 51.0 
seconds 
Table 6: Evacuation Times 
 
 
8.3.7 Conclusion 
The Simulex results show that there are sufficient escape routes in place so that all the 
people in the building can be evacuated safely in the event of any of the design fire 
scenarios or possible bomb scare. 
 
From the result of FDS and the evacuation times calculated by Simulex have been 
able to show that everyone in the building is able to evacuate safely before untenable 
conditions are reached. 
 
Simulex can provide useful insight into evacuation times and how people may react in 
the event of an emergency.  However, the model is only a simulation and it is created 
using a number of simplifications and assumptions, which should be taken into 
account when applying the results to real life situations.  For example, although there 
are different types of people entered into the model, there is no break down of the 
individual characteristics of people within those types.  There model also does not 
take into account people mental state and the possibility that some people may panic 
and others may simply ignore the alarms completely.  Nevertheless, it’s assumed that 
the conservative estimates that have been adopted for these inputs will compensate for 
the simplifications. 
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8.4 Conclusions from simulations  
Finally the building has been designed and tested for four different fire scenarios. 
With no special protection, the model results show that the fires are unlikely to 
present a risk of failure for the structure or for its occupants. 
Indeed, with values of temperatures and hazardous fire products staying below all the 
critical levels, the safety of these parts of the building is guarantied against such fires 
without any use of fire protection or fire suppression.  
The results show that the building does not collapse when subjected to the standard 
temperature time curve. They also show that the actual design fires, as modelled by 
FDS, produce significantly lower temperatures on the structural elements than the 
standard temperature time curve. Consequently, the displacements and stresses 
calculated by ABAQUS are significantly higher when the sections are exposed to the 
standard temperature time curve. 
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9 Achieving the Objectives 
Through the use of performance based design it has been shown that the 
Transportation centre meets the objectives.   
 
• All of the buildings occupants are able to evacuate safely in the event of a fire. 
It has been shown through the use of FDS and Simulex that all of the building 
occupants will be able to evacuate safely before untenable conditions are 
reached. 
 
• Fire fighters will be able to safely evacuate the building or attack the fire. 
Special access has been provided for fire fighters, where there is information 
provided on the layout of the building.  It has been shown though the use of 
ABAQUS, the building will not collapse in the event of a fire, so the fire 
fighters will be able to carry out there job safely. 
 
• The structure will not collapse due to fire. 
It has been shown through the use of FDS and ABAQUS that the building will 
not collapse due to the worst-case scenario design fires. 
 
• In the event of a fire there will be minimal business interruption. 
Through the use of compartmentation and zoning and with smoke extraction, 
the business interruption has been minimized. 
                                                                                             
                                                                                                         
   
44/45 
 
 
10 REFERENCES 
 
1. ARUP Fire (2001), ST Pancras Station – “Fire Precautions and Evacuation 
(100-RUP-RLEEA-00006-AF)” 
 
2. Swedish National Testing and Research Institute, (1994) “Fire in Tunnels 
Proceedings” 
 
3. ABAQUS User Manuals (XXXX), Getting Started with ABAQUS/Standard: 
Interactive Version Version 6.3’ 
 
4. National Institute of Standards and Technology, (2002), “Fire Dynamics 
Simulator (Version 3) - User’s Guide”  
 
5. (2000) “Performance Based Codes”, Sweden 
 
6. National Institute of Standards and Technology, http://www.bfrl.nist.gov 
 
7. ABAQUS Website, http://www.abaqus.com/about/about.html 
 
8. An Introduction to Fire Dynamics”, 2nd Edition, Dougal Drysdale 
 
9. Relationships for smoke control calculations Technical Memoranda TM:19: 
1995 
The Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers.   
 
10. Building Regulations - Approved Document B, 2000 
 
11. Enclosure Fire Dynamics, Bjørn Karlsson and James G. Quintiere 1999. 
 
12. BS 5588-11: 1997, Fire precautions in the design, construction and use of 
buildings. Code of practice for shops, offices, industrial, storage and other 
similar buildings 
 
13. BS 5839 Part 1: 2002, Fire detection and alarm systems for buildings. Code of 
practice for system design, installation, commissioning and maintenance 
 
14. BS 6387: 1994, Specification for performance requirements for cables 
required to maintain circuit integrity under fire conditions 
 
15. BS 5266 Part 1: 1999, Emergency lighting. Code of practice for the 
emergency lighting of premises other than cinemas and certain other specified 
premises used for entertainment. 
 
                                                                                             
                                                                                                         
   
45/45 
 
 
16. KIDDE wet chemical system, http://www.noha.no/SlokkesystemerEN.shtml 
 
17. Retail Fit-Out Guide from UK. 
 
18. HSE/HMRI: Railway Safety Principles and Guidance Parts 1 and 2. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
                                                                                                         
   
 - 1 - 
 
Appendix 1: Auto Cad Drawings. 
 
 
 
These drawings contain evacuation routes and fire safety symbols. 
 
 
Nr. 1: Site Plan 
Nr. 2: Main Terminal, street level 
Nr. 3: Main Terminal, lower level 
Nr. 4: Platform level 
Nr. 5: Bus Terminal 
Nr. 6: Main Terminal, upper level 
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Appendix 2: Mechanical Smoke Extraction    
   
The calculations are taken from CIBSE Technical Memoranda TM19:   
1995: Relationships for Smoke Control Calculations   
  
Variables used are defined as follows:   
  
M = Mass flow of entrained air (kg/s)   
  
Q = Rate of heat release (kW) = 1,5 QP  
  
QP = Convective portion of heat release rate (kW)   
  
Z = Height above base of fire to bottom of smoke layer (m)   
  
Z1 = Limiting height of intermittent flames (m)   
  
Tm = Average temperature of plume (K)   
  
T0 = Ambient air temperature 293 K   
  
TS = Average temperature of smoke layer (K)   
  
Cp = Specific heat capacity of air 1,02  kJ/kgK   
  
ρ0 = Density of ambient air (kg/m3) 1,22 kg/m3   
  
g = Acceleration due to gravity 9,81 m/s2   
  
h = Height of ceiling above base of fire (m)   
  
VS = Volume of smoke (m3)   
  
β = Extract factor:  2 where extract near wall   
    2,8 otherwise   
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Scenario:   
Fire in Restaurant area.   
  
Assumptions:   
  
3,5 m Z, clear layer height above floor level.   
  
5 m, ceiling height above floor    
  
3000 kW, steady state heat output Q   
  
2000 kW, steady state convective heat output QP   
  
3 m, diameter fire (dS)   
Calculations:   
  
Mass flow rate:   
  
M = 0,071*QP1/3 *Z5/3   
    
M = 7,21 kg/s    
  
Temperature in smoke layer at Z = 3,5m   
  
TS = QP/(M*cP)+T0   
  
TS = 564,67 K   291,67 °C   
  
Flame height:   
  
Z1 = 0,035*QP2/3/[dS+0,074*QP2/5]2/3   
  
Z1 2,02 m   
  
The top of the flames is lower than the bottom    
of the smoke layer, Z = 3,5   
  
Volume of smoke extract required:   
  
V = M/ρ0+Qp/(ρ0*T0*cp)   
   
V 11,40 m3/s    
  
To avoid plugholing is it necessary to have several extraction points    
to limit the amount of smoke being extracted from a single point.     
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Assuming dimension of 1m, and the critical dimension is the distance    
from the intake to the base of the smoke layer.   
  
The critical mass extract rate through a single extract point is :   
  
M = β[g(h-Z)5*(TS-T0)*T0]0,5/TS   
  
M 12,07 kg/s   
  
Number of extraction points:   
  
 2 extraction points would be sufficient in the restaurant   
  1 in the lobby  
   
      5 m3/s each has been provided per extraction point.    
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Scenario:   
Fire in Shop   
  
Assumptions:   
  
3,5 m, diameter fire (ds)   
  
3,5 m Z, clear layer height above floor level.   
  
5 m, ceiling height above floor    
  
3750 kW, steady state heat release    
  
2500 kW, steady state convective heat output QP   
  
Calculations:   
  
Mass flow rate:   
  
M = 0,071*QP1/3 *Z5/3  
  
M = 7,77 kg/s    
  
Temperature in smoke layer at Z = 3,5m   
  
TS = QP/(M*cP)+T0   
  
TS = 608,24K   335,24 °C   
  
Flame height:   
  
Z1 = 0,035*QP2/3/[dS+0,074*QP2/5]2/3  
  
Z1 1,96 m   
  
The top of the flames is lower than the bottom    
of the smoke layer, Z = 3,5   
  
Volume of smoke extract required:   
  
V = M/ρ0+Qp/(ρ0*T0*CP)   
  
V = 13,22 m3/s   
  
To avoid plugholing is it necessary to have several extraction points    
to limit the amount of smoke being extracted from a single point.     
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Assuming dimension of 1m, and the critical dimension is the distance 
from the intake to the base of the smoke layer.   
  
The critical mass extract rate through a single extract point is:   
  
M = β[g(h-Z)5*(TS-T0)*T0]0,5/TS   
  
M = 12,07 kg/s   
  
2 extraction points would be sufficient    
 per shop   
  
Two extraction points witch extract 7 m3/s each    
will be provided per shop.   
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Scenario:    
Baggage fire in train waiting area.   
  
Assumptions:   
  
1,6 m, dS diameter fire   
  
8 m, Z, clear layer height above floor level.   
  
10 m, ceiling height above floor    
  
1500 kW, steady state heat release    
  
1000 kW, steady state convective heat output QP   
  
 
Calculations:   
  
Mass flow rate:   
  
M = 0,071*QP1/3 *Z5/3   
  
M = 22,72 kg/s    
  
Temperature in smoke layer at Z = 8m   
  
TS = QP/(M*cp)+T0   
  
TS = 336,15 K   63,15 °C   
  
Flame height:   
  
Z1 = 0,035*Qp2/3/[dS+0,074*Qp5/2]2/3 
  
Z1 = 1,62 m   
  
 
Volume of smoke extract required:   
  
V = M/ρ0+Qp/(ρ0*T0*cp)   
  
V = 21,36 m3/s   
  
To avoid plugholing is it necessary to have several extraction points    
to limit the amount of smoke being extracted from a single point.     
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Assuming dimension of 1m, and the critical dimension is the distance    
from the intake to the base of the smoke layer.   
  
The critical mass extract rate through a single extract point is:   
  
M = β[g(h-Z)5*(TS-T0)*T0]0,5/TS   
  
M 16,59 kg/s   
  
Number of extraction points:   
  
2 extraction points would be sufficient    
    
There will be several extraction points in the waiting area,   
|minimum two per zone in the area.   
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Appendix 3: Natural Smoke ventilation       
  
Scenario:    
Bus burning in repair area, or bus loading area.   
  
The calculations is from: Byggdetaljer 520.327 Eidmund Skåret 1995   
Based on :   
Meland, Øystein, Jensen, Geir og Skåret Eidmund: Smoke control. Oslo 1989   
Heskestad, Gunar: Engineering Relations for Fire Plumes. Fire Safety Journal nr. 7, 
1984   
  
Assumptions:   
  
Ground Area:  A: 1000 m2   
 
Convective factor for the fire:  CF: 0,6   
  
Height to ceiling:  ZH: 10 m   
 
Height from floor to smoke layer:  ZSJ: 7 m 
   
From fire to smoke layer: Z = 5,65 m   
 
Thickness smoke layer:   ZSL = 3 m 
   
Loss of heat to surroundings:     CS = 0,85   
  
Thermal capacity:  cp = 1,02 kJ/kgK   
  
Smoke hatches extraction efficiently:   CV = 0,6   
  
Pf: Perimeter of the fire.   r = 3,1784 m,  Pf  = 19,9704762 m   
  
T0 = 293 K  
  
N = 1 Fire in middle of room   
N = 2 Fire near wall   
N = 3 Fire in corner   
    
Time to fire brigade arrives: 10 min   
  
Rate if heat release: Q = 20000 kW   
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Calculations:   
  
Virtual origin:   
Z0 = -1,02*D+0,083*Q2/5   
Z0 = -2,12 m   
  
Critical height: 
Z1 = Z0+0,166(CF*Q) 2/5   
Z1 = 4,98 m   
Z/Z1 = 1,13 >1   
  
 
Mass flow of entrained air:    
mPL = 1/N*0,071*(CF*Q)1/3*(Z-Z0)5/3*(1+0,026*(CF*Q)2/3*(Z-Z0)-5/3)   
  
mPL = 71,74 kg/s   
  
Density of ambient air   
ρ0 = 1,22 kg/m3   
  
Necessary extraction capacity:   
  
qEC = ( CS*Q)/(ρ0*T0) + (mPL/ρ0)   
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qEC = 106,36 m3/s   
  
Temperature rise in smoke layers:    
  
∆TPL = ( CS*Q)/(CP*mPL)   
  
∆TPL = 232,31 K   
  
Temperature in smoke layer:   
  
Tg = T0 + ∆TPL   
   
Tg = 525,31 K    
  
Decrees of pressure coefficient:     
   
ξv = 1/CV2   
  
ξv = 2,77777778    
  
Decrees of pressure coefficient for the air in to the building:      
  
ξAI = 2,4   
  
Smoke hatch area    
  
AV = qEC*(ξv*(1+(ξAI*T0)/(ξv*Tg)))1/2/(2*9,81*(ZH-ZSJ)*∆TPL/T0)1/2   
  
Av = 31,58 m2   
  
Area smoke hatches: 32 m2      
Will be provided in both areas    
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Scenario:    
Fire in Main Waiting area:    
   
The calculations are taked from CIBSE Thechnical Memoranda TM19:   
1995:Relationships for Smoke Control Calculations   
  
Assumptions:   
  
The following design criteria have been used in the calculations:   
  
1000 kW, Qp convective heat output (baggage fire)   
14 m, ZSJ clear layer height   
21 m, Z height to ceiling   
* Smoke extracted trough hatches in the ceiling   
* Axisymmetric smoke plume   
  
The mass flow rate of smoke into layer is given by:   
  
M = 0,071*Qp1/3*ZSJ5/3   
  
M = 57,73 kg/s   
  
The temperature of the smoke is given by:    
  
Ts = (Qp/M*Cp) +T0   
  
Thermal capacity:   
Cp = 1,02 kJ/kgK   
  
Temperatur of the ambient air:   
T0 293 K   
  
Ts: 309,97 K  36,97 °C   
  
Flame height:   
  
Z1 = ( 0,035*Qp2/3)/(ds+0,074*Qp2/5)2/3  
  
Fuel diameter:   
ds =  1,6 m   
   
Z1= 1,77 m   
  
Necessary extraction capacity:   
  
qEC=(M/ρ0)+(Qp/(ρ0*T0*Cp))   
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 Density of ambient air:   
ρ0 = 1,22 kg/m3   
  
qEC = 50,06 m3/s   
  
Temperature rise in smoke layers:     
  
∆TPL = ( Cs*Q)/(Cp*M)   
  
Loss of heat to surroundings:      
Cs = 0,85   
  
∆TPL = 14,43 K   
  
Temperature in smoke layer:   
   
Tg = T0 + ∆TPL   
  
Tg = 307,43 K   
  
Decrees of pressure coefficient:     
   
ξv = 1/Cv2  
  
Smoke hatches extraction efficiently:    
Cv = 0,6   
  
ξv = 2,77777778   
  
Decrees of pressure coefficient for the air in to the building:      
  
ξAI = 2,4   
  
Smoke hatch area     
   
Av = qEC*(ξv*(1+(ξAI*T0)/(ξv*Tg)))1/2/(2*9,81*(ZH-ZSJ)*∆TPL/T0)1/2   
  
Av = 43,32 m2   
  
Area smoke hatches: 43,32 m2  
  
Air in to this area:       
    
Main entrance:  8*3 24 m2   
West entrance:  3,3*3*2 19,8 m2    
 
Sum 43,8 m2   
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 Scenario:    
Fire in Bus Waiting area:    
  
Assumptions:   
  
The following design criteria have been used in the calculations:   
  
1000 kW, Qp convective heat output (baggage fire)   
6 m, Zsj clear layer height   
10 m, Z height to ceiling   
* Smoke extracted trough hatches in the ceiling   
* Axisymmetric smoke plume   
  
The mass flow rate of smoke into layer, is given by:   
  
M = 0,071*Qp1/3*Z5/3   
  
M = 14,06 kg/s   
  
The temperature of the smoke is given by:   
  
Ts = (Qp/M*cp)+T0   
  
Thermal capacity:   
Cp = 1,02 kJ/kgK   
  
Temperatur of the ambient air:   
T0 = 293 K   
  
Ts: 362,69 K   89,69 °C   
  
Flame height:   
  
Z1 = ( 0,035*Qp2/3)/(ds+0,074*Qp2/5)2/3   
  
Fuel diameter:   
ds =1,6 m   
   
Z1 = 1,77 m   
  
Necessary extraction capacity:   
  
qEC=(M/ρ0)+(Qp/(ρ0*T0*Cp))   
  
Density of ambient air:   
ρ0 = 1,22 kg/m3   
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qEC = 14,27 m3/s   
  
Temperature rise in smoke layers:     
  
∆TPL = (Cs*Q)/(Cp*M)   
  
Loss of heat to surroundings:      
Cs = 0,85   
  
∆TPL = 59,24 K   
  
Temperature in smoke layer:   
   
Tg = T0 + ∆TPL   
  
Tg = 352,24 K   
  
Decrees of pressure coefficient:     
   
ξv = 1/Cv2   
   
Smoke hatches extraction efficiently:    
Cv = 0,6   
  
ξv = 2,77777778   
  
Decrees of pressure coefficient for the air in to the building:      
  
ξAI = 2,4   
  
Smoke hatch area     
  
Av = qEC*(ξv*(1+(ξAI*T0)/(ξv*Tg)))1/2/(2*9,81*(ZH-ZSJ)*∆TPL/T0)1/2   
  
Av = 7,82 m2   
  
Area smoke hatches: 8 m2  
   
Air into this area is sufficient     
  
Main entrance:   
  
4*3 12 m2   
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Appendix 4: Water screen 
 
These results is taken from the report made by Øyvind E. Reiersen and John Ivar 
Stange, students at there final year for Bachelor in Fire Engineering at 
Stord/Haugesund University College in Norway. It is possible to get this report if you 
contact the University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type Plasement 
against the 
fire 
Loss of heat radiation in %  
 1 m 3 m 5 m Average loss 
for each height 
Average loss 
for overall 
heights 
     
    
    
Attempt 8 87 87 81 Modifyed 
 
Center 
Attempt10 54 58 56 
70,5 72,5 68,5 70,5 % 
     
    
    
Attempt 4 63 66 67  
Modifyed 
 
On the side 
Attempt 5 71 75 69 
67,0 70,5 68,0 68,5 % 
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Appendix 5. Heat Radiation.         
  
The calculations are taken from:    
Enclosure Fire Dynamics, Bjørn Karlsson and James G. Quuintiere, 1999    
 
q = ΦεσT4  
q = Radiation [w/m2]   
Φ = Configuration factor   
ε = Emissivity 1   
σ = Stefan-Boltzmann constant 5, 67E-08 W/m2K4 
T4 = Flame temp.  [1300 K]   
 
Table 7,1 gives this equation for configuration factor   
  
Fd 1-2 = 1/2*π [ a/rot(a2+c2)*tan-1*(b/rot(a2+c2) + b/rot(b2+c2)* tan-1*(a/rot(b2+c2)] 
 
Ftot = 4*Fd 1-2   
  
a = 0,5 m   
b = 6,1 m   
c = distance m 
 
Distance    Configuration factor Heat Rad. 
c [m]    Ftot q [kW/m2 
0  1,48901195 0,08178438 1 161,94087 
0,1  1,45851543 0,08176246 0,98057135 158,794578
0,2  1,37669251 0,08169675 0,92843944 150,352291
0,3  1,26522782 0,08158748 0,85740925 138,8496 
0,4  1,14491772 0,081435 0,78072039 126,430539
0,5  1,02911773 0,08123978 0,70687554 114,47204 
0,6  0,92407564 0,08100244 0,63985258 103,618284
0,7  0,83157658 0,08072374 0,58078842 94,0533818
0,8  0,75119746 0,08040453 0,52941427 85,7338071
0,9  0,68164421 0,0800458 0,48490692 78,5262486
1  0,62141404 0,07964863 0,44631036 72,2758873
1,1  0,56908042 0,07921422 0,41271719 66,8357802
1,2  0,52339339 0,07874384 0,38333246 62,0771928
1,3  0,48329734 0,07823885 0,35748504 57,891438 
1,4  0,44791603 0,07770069 0,334618 54,1883293
1,5  0,41652727 0,07713085 0,31427252 50,8935646
1,6  0,38853664 0,07653088 0,29607118 47,9460242
1,7  0,36345411 0,07590238 0,27970302 45,2953509
1,8  0,3408742 0,07524696 0,26491096 42,8999118
1,9  0,32045992 0,0745663 0,2514815 40,7251329
2  0,3019297 0,07386204 0,23923645 38,7421592
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